r51due

本篇paper代写- Foreign IPO underpricing theory讨论了国外IPO抑价理论。IPO抑价是指股票首次公开发行时定价较低，首日交易价大幅上涨，新股认购者能够获得超额回报的一种现象。西方金融学界就IPO抑价展开了大量的研究，并形成了三个较为活跃的理论解说流派，分别是运用不对称信息理论来解释IPO抑价现象的非对称信息流派；从证券市场上针对IPO股票特定的制度规定来解释IPO抑价现象的制度成因流派；运用行为经济学的范式来分析IPO抑价原因的非理性行为流派。本篇paper代写由51due代写平台整理，供大家参考阅读。

IPO underpricing refers to the phenomenon that the initial public offering price of a stock is low, the first day of trading price rises sharply, and the new share subscribers can obtain excess returns. It was not until the early 1970s that the financial community really paid attention to this abnormal price in the securities market. Stoll and Curley, Logue, Reilly, Ibbotson were among the first scholars to find and systematically describe IPO underpricing in the U.S. securities market from the available literature. Since then, a number of studies have shown that IPO underpricing is not a unique phenomenon in the U.S. market, which is prevalent in global securities markets. In general, IPO prices in mature markets such as Europe and America are about 10% to 20% lower, while those in emerging markets are usually over 50% lower.

Based on asymmetric information theory to explain the cause of the underpricing phenomenon, its basic assumption is that the IPO underpricing rate is positively related to the degree of information asymmetry, the IPO underpricing is caused by information asymmetry of the risk compensation, when the uncertainty caused by asymmetric information reduced to zero, the underpricing phenomenon will disappear in the primary market, issuers, underwriters and investors the three market main body, there is information asymmetry between them, thus cause the underpricing phenomenon. According to the different objects examined by information asymmetry, they can be divided into the following three situations, namely, three hypotheses:

Baron and Holmstrom point to a potential conflict of interest between issuers and underwriters: while the issuer demands maximum proceeds from the offering, underwriters have an incentive to set a lower price in order to reduce costs and the amount of work during the underwriting period. From this perspective, underwriters have more discretion over IPO pricing than issuers when IPO underpricing is an established fact, but they themselves believe that fierce competition among investment Banks makes evidence of this conclusion difficult to obtain. Baron defines underwriters' pricing advantages as information advantages. It also points out that the benefits obtained by the issuer by using the underwriter's right of suggestion are the decreasing function of the issuer's grasp of market demand. The optimal issue price is the increasing function of market demand. It is obvious that the role of the recommendation function of the underwriters is gradually decreasing with the increase of the issuer's understanding of the market demand. In the absence of market demand information, issuers have to compromise pricing to ensure a successful offering. He argues that underpricing is the result of this two-way asymmetric information and USES it as a reward for using information owned by underwriters. But we see that underwriting fees should be a direct return on the services and information of the underwriters involved in the IPO process. In fact, underpricing also reduces underwriting fees rather than increases them. A natural corollary, therefore, is that the asymmetric information in the proxy gives the underwriters the opportunity to allocate underpriced shares to their loyal customers to enhance their competitiveness.

Rock believes that investors as a whole have more information than issuers, but investors are divided into informed investors and uninformed investors. Informed investors know exactly what the shares are worth and will only subscribe if the offer price is less than the value of the shares. Clearly, the acceptance rate for an uninformed investor's subscription will vary depending on whether the informed investor is participating in the subscription. When the ipo price is higher than the value of the stock, the informed investor abandons the new share subscription, thus the acceptance rate of the uninformed investor increases, otherwise reduces. The result left unwitting investors in the "winner's curse", leaving them with little incentive to buy new shares. The issuer needs the participation of all types of investors to ensure the success of the IPO, so the IPO price must be set at a level below the expected value of the stock, that is, to attract uninformed investors through IPO underpricing.

Grinblatt and Hwang argue that the two "signals" -- the price at which shares are issued and the percentage retained by the issuer's original shareholders -- show the future cash flow of the issuer offering, reflecting the company's intrinsic value. After the issuer's shares go public, with the expansion of business scale, there will be the need for refinancing, that is, the listed company can issue warrants to the old shareholders or issue new shares to the public. At this point, investors will look at the company's initial offering. If the price is too high, investors will have doubts about the company's secondary offering pricing, which is not conducive to the refinancing of issuers. As a result, issuers use IPO underpricing to prepare investors for refinancing by giving them a higher return on their investment.

Allen and Faulhaber argue that positive underpricing is a "signal" that "shows" the value of the issuer. "Good performance" issuers to release company by selecting lower than actual value of the price, to potential investors "show" has a good development prospect, and "poor performance" issuer issuing company if choose the offering price below its actual value, so will face the shortage of underpricing issues place to bring the financing risk, and will also face before refinancing by investors detect the risk of company real performance, lead to refinancing plan, do not have access to more capital, so you don't choose it. Therefore, the underpricing and underpricing of the primary market share reflect the strengths and weaknesses of the issuer's company performance. IPO underpricing is the "signal" that the issuer "shows" to investors, indicating the real value of the issuer; IPO underpricing reaches a certain level, which prevents "underperforming" companies from doing the same. Only then can potential investors use this signal to judge that the issuers behind the underpricing strategy are "better-performing" companies.

Welch believes that when deciding whether to buy the new shares issued by the issuer, investors will not only make their own judgment on the investment value of the new shares, but also pay attention to whether other investors pay the price of the new share sheet to attract the initial small number of investors, so as to drive other investors to apply for the new shares.

In addition, an issuer can signal to investors a lower risk by entrusting reputable investment Banks to underwrite the shares. Using data from the 1980s in the United States, it was found that the reputation of investment Banks provided signals to the market about the risks of companies. Companies underwritten by investment Banks with low reputation had significantly higher underpricing rates than those underwritten by investment Banks with high reputation.

TinicHughes and Thakor argue that issuers are intentionally underpricing their offerings to reduce the risk of lawsuits. In order to regulate the securities market effectively, the most typical method adopted by the government is to formulate the information disclosure rules. The rule requires that when companies are listed and securities traders are engaged in securities trading, relevant information must be fully disclosed in accordance with the requirements. The purpose is to prevent various opportunistic behaviors in the process of securities issuance and trading. Because of differing understandings of "full disclosure," strict disclosure rules expose underwriters, accountants and issuers to significant legal risks, and shareholders can Sue them for misstatements or omissions of facts in the prospectus.

Ruud proposed the price support theory of IPO underpricing. This theory does not think lead underwriters are deliberately underpricing issuing new shares, instead they will lower the price after the listed on the expectations of the market value, to listed below the issue price of new shares, the lead underwriters will price support action, so the lead underwriters market interventions to eliminate the left half of the initial yield, namely expect new initial yield greater than zero.

To internal unit set lock period, this is the system arrangement in most markets, lock period is 6 months commonly. Aggarwal, Krigman and Womack analyzed the impact of lock-in period on IPO pricing, and pointed out that since managers' shareholders can only sell their shares after the lockout period expires, managers' shareholders' target is not the highest IPO price, but the maximum value of the shares they hold at the end of lock-in period. When the ipo is underpriced, the jump in share prices on the first day of trading will attract more analysts and media attention, generating information momentum and sparking demand from secondary market investors. When the lockup period is over, management shareholders can sell their shares at a better price. Therefore, they regard IPO underpricing as strategic behavior of management shareholders.

要想成绩好，英国论文得写好，51due代写平台为你提供英国留学资讯，专业辅导，还为你提供专业英国essay代写，paper代写，report代写，需要找论文代写的话快来联系我们51due工作客服QQ：800020041或者Wechat：Abby0900吧。