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下面为大家整理一篇优秀的essay代写范文- Civil war，供大家参考学习，这篇论文讨论了哥伦比亚内战。哥伦比亚内战持续了将近半个世纪，饱受战争之苦的哥伦比亚人民期盼和平。虽然和平局势似乎近在咫尺，可总是事与愿违，哥伦比亚内战不仅没有停止，反而愈演愈烈。从现实情况看，哥伦比亚内战在短期内不会终结，除非一方取得决定性的军事胜利，或多方互相愿意妥协，或国际社会强力干涉；否则和平谈判难进行，内战仍然会持续下去。

The Colombian civil war originated in the peasant resistance movement of the 1960s. In those days, the rich demanded that farmers leave their ancestral lands in order to develop coffee farming and livestock farming, provoking a backlash from farmers. Influenced by the international communist movement, the resistance movement gradually developed into the communist movement.

Cuba had initially been active in helping Colombia's resistance movement with weapons, training and organizing, while the Soviet union saw Colombia as a sphere of influence for the United States and was on the fence to avoid conflict with the United States. At the end of the cold war, the partisans split into many forces, each fighting for itself and not cooperating with each other. In the 1970s, guerrilla movements took a hit, with smaller groups falling to the government. The larger guerrilla groups refuse to co-operate with the government.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s Colombia's drug problem began to emerge. First the marijuana trade, then coca cultivation and smuggling, Colombia gradually became the source of drugs in South America, known as the "silver triangle". Initially, the drug problem had nothing to do with the guerrillas. The ideal and political proposition of the guerrillas is to establish a strong regime, carry out political reforms, oppose capitalism, distrust drug smugglers at all, and drug traffickers also regard guerrilla organizations as natural enemies. Over time, however, the two forces have come to see the need for cooperation. Guerrilla organizations can provide security for drug dealers; Drug traffickers can provide guerrilla groups with huge funds and arms smuggling channels. Guerrillas often collect protection fees from drug producers in areas under their own control or influence. In this way, drug dealers can produce drugs in places suitable for cultivation of coca without any interference. Although the cooperation is not perfect, the interdependence between the two has been strengthened.

In addition, kidnapping, bank robbery, extortion and so on, also became the guerrilla economic source. An estimated 54 percent of the farc's 8,000-10,000 members come from drug trafficking and 36 percent from various other criminal activities.

It is not accurate to say that Colombia's guerrillas have become an offshoot of the drug cartels, a mob with no ideological basis. The revolutionary armed forces of Colombia is actually a political organization with a clear goal. It has a fairly complete program of action to build a more democratic, pluralistic and patriotic government. This was also included in the national liberation army programme, established in 1964, but with a greater focus on natural resources, particularly oil. The group, which has about 4,500 people, was declared a legitimate political force on June 6, 2000, but there are still clashes with government forces.

In addition to the guerrillas, paramilitary groups have been players in Colombia's civil war for many years. Paramilitary groups were local security forces formed by landlords threatened by guerrillas in the early years of the civil war. Since the government could not or was unwilling to take firm action against the rebels, the government adopted a tacit stance towards their formation, even targeting military groups for recruitment, formation, training and equipment. Hundreds of right-wing paramilitaries have sprung up in Colombia since the first paramilitaries were formed in December 1981 by 223 drug lords in karim province. Backed by government forces, these groups have done a lot of dirty work under the banner of security. Later, the paramilitaries morphed into mafia-like local militias, serving whomever paid for them.

Decades of conflict have shown that the presence of multiple armed forces has put the Colombian government in a stand-off with non-government armed forces. Government forces are unable to defeat guerrilla, paramilitary and drug-trafficking forces across the country, or even to restore peace in the countryside. Similarly, even with the powerful economic support of the drug trade behind the scenes, the guerrillas are not able to defeat the government forces and seize power. Paramilitary groups have the capacity to carry out terrorist activities in many rural areas, but do not have the strength to compete with the government. Despite their considerable influence, drug trafficking has little say in the vital issue of national development.

Politically, the farc did not expect peace, especially the kind that might lead to its dissolution, because war was of great benefit to them. Guerrillas earn far more than government soldiers, enjoy a higher reputation in their communities and enjoy better conditions. The top brass of the guerrilla group lived in relative comfort. As a result of illegal activities such as drug trafficking, kidnapping, extortion and bank robbery, the guerrilla units have sufficient financial resources to expand their fighting capacity, as evidenced by the fact that their ranks have been growing in recent years.

The Colombian people want peace and the government is under tremendous pressure, so successive governments advocate dialogue. But resistance from various forces is strong: the wealthy oppose the economic reforms required by the farc; The army does not support the inclusion of foreign relations and national alliances on the agenda; The authority that has long dominated Colombian society is firmly opposed to political reforms in social democracy and economic rights; Colombia's financial and administrative departments are reluctant to give the army enough support to win the war or to change their conservative stance on reform. Thus, the minimum reforms that the guerrillas claim are rejected by the Colombian government.

What's more, those at the top of the city were barely touched. Although they sometimes worry about being the target of violent threats such as kidnapping and extortion, money buys them security. They pay to hire bodyguards, to buy all kinds of security, to protect themselves and their families. Children from rich or middle-class families who have the opportunity to receive higher education are rarely drafted under the universal compulsory military service. In this way, Colombia's civil war was really a war of the poor against the poor. Members of the drug-trafficking, paramilitary, guerrilla and government forces fighting in the war are from the lower classes! In contrast to the countryside, the city is heavily garrisoned and heavily guarded, with few major attacks. Despite the prevalence of kidnapping, it was mainly aimed at people below the rich. The pampered upper classes are rarely affected, so they do not press for change.

Despite their desire for peace, the middle class does not have much say in national political life, has limited influence on policy makers and is not interested in military action. They do not realize that peace can be achieved only by making the necessary sacrifices in return for victory in war.

Successive governments in Colombia have worked to defeat the guerrillas militarily, force them into peace talks and steer clear of drug trafficking. However, as the farc gained more victories than defeats in the civil war, the acquisition of funds and weapons was relatively easy, its strength was stable and continued to grow, government forces could not gain military advantages, and there were no conditions for peace talks. As a result of the early attacks on police kiosks, the police had to withdraw from remote villages to protect large towns, leaving most rural areas without national security forces and becoming the domain of guerrillas. For drug crimes, the police are powerless.

Government forces are in even more trouble. It is estimated that 20 per cent of the Colombian forces carry out critical and VIP protection functions, 25 per cent conduct training, 25 per cent engage in rear service and only 30 per cent undertake active offensive against the enemy. Moreover, the army's equipment was, and still is, behind the modern weaponry of the well-heeled guerrillas. Government forces do not have enough airlift, water and even cars and armoured vehicles. The Columbia mountain range, the river, the plains, the forests, makes transportation a major obstacle to military action.

The army has been unable to defeat the guerrillas despite receiving aid from abroad. The civil war in Colombia has affected American security, especially on drug trafficking. As a result, the United States has shown considerable concern over the deterioration of the situation in Colombia in recent years. In February 2000, the United States provided Colombia with more advanced helicopters for intelligence cooperation, including satellite information sharing and military communications equipment, as well as equipment and training for anti-drug forces. But in order to avoid becoming embroiled in the civil war, American support for the Colombian government has been clandestine, maintaining a low level of involvement.

Today, the Colombian civil war has evolved into a strange kind of war: a combination of ideological, economic, political, domestic military relations, kidnapping and extortion, drug crimes, localised rather than nationalised wars for control of spheres of influence and resources. In reality, the Colombian civil war will not end in the short term unless one party achieves a decisive military victory, or the parties are willing to compromise with each other, or the international community ACTS forcefully to intervene. Otherwise, peace talks will be difficult and the civil war will continue.

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