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本篇paper代写- Transfer of credit assets讨论了信贷资产转让。银行同业信贷资产转让业务是指银行与其他金融同业之间买卖一笔或者一组信贷资产的业务，其转让对象仅限于同业机构，包括商业银行、信托公司和财务公司等，可以接受非金融机构为信贷资产转让提供担保，转让标的仅限于同业金融机构向非金融机构提供的信贷资产，不包括金融同业的各类权益性资产，转让方式包括有一次性买断和回购。一般而言，信贷资产转让是对金融市场的深度利用。本篇paper代写由51due代写平台整理，供大家参考阅读。

Generally speaking, the autonomous transaction must satisfy both parties' pursuit and division of the "consumer surplus" generated after the change of market conditions. From the perspective of foreign financial development, bank credit asset transfer is based on such a basic logic, which started in the 1970s and became popular in the 1990s. In the scope of counterparty, the range of Banks extended to Banks and non-financial institutions. Recently, the transfer of credit assets was advanced to a new stage through the securitization of credit assets. With the advancement of commercialization, Chinese Banks began to pursue and carve up the "consumer surplus" in the transfer of credit assets, and all the business of credit asset transfer was in form the same as that of western credit asset transfer. However, through a period of practice, we find that the credit asset transfer business in China has presented a distinct picture from that in foreign countries, and even dissimilated into a tool to evade regulation. Based on the purpose of further promoting Chinese financial innovation on the basis of norms, this paper considers the following questions: what is the basis of credit asset transfer? What is the underlying cause of the different picture of China's asset transfer business? What lessons should Chinese regulators draw?

Interbank credit asset transfer business refers to the business of buying and selling a credit asset or a group of credit assets between a bank and other financial peers. The objects of transfer are limited to inter-bank institutions, including commercial Banks, trust companies, financial companies, financial leasing companies, asset management companies, etc., and non-financial institutions can provide guarantee for the transfer of credit assets. The transfer of the subject matter is limited to the credit assets provided to non-financial institutions by the inter-bank financial institutions, excluding the various equity assets of the inter-bank financial institutions; The transfer includes a one-time buyout and a buyback.

In general, the transfer of credit assets is a deep use of financial markets. According to modern financial theory, the bank is an institution that produces financial products. The essence of the bank's credit business is the process in which the bank produces financial products and collects service fees from individuals and institutions in the society by transferring the right to use funds. Since the essence of the credit business is only the temporary transfer of the right to use the funds, the bank has partial control over the credit financial products, such as the loan contract, so as to guarantee the right to use the funds when the loan is due. Therefore, the result of the bank's credit business is that the lender has obtained the temporary right to use the funds, and the bank has obtained the mark of credit financial products -- the credit contract that guarantees the recovery of the funds and the payment of service fees.

From the latest development of economics, as long as two subjects have different subjective evaluation of the same commodity at the same time, there will be trading space, and it may bring "consumer surplus" for both parties. In this view, as long as different commercial Banks have different evaluation of the same credit or a group of credit products, they also have the power to transfer credit contracts. And causes of different subjective evaluation of the same credit contracts has such kinds roughly: one is due to a certain point, different bank faced the liquidity needs of constraint, and the liquidity demand often for hard constraints, so part of the bank in order to obtain liquidity, will reduce the already paid out but did not expire can't recover the credit assets evaluation, and improve the subjective evaluation of cash assets. Second, at some point, different Banks need to adjust the distribution structure of credit contracts for risk diversification. For the same credit asset or A group of credit assets, it may be the project that needs to be increased for bank A, but for bank B, it may be the project that needs to be reduced. In this way, there will also be differences in the subjective evaluation of the same credit asset or a group of credit assets. Third, the risk preference of different bank owners and operators has changed relatively. For example, due to the changes in capital structure and other reasons, bank A's risk tolerance decreases, and their evaluation of the risky credit asset contract decreases. On the contrary, A bank B may improve its subjective evaluation of the contract. In particular, due to the adjustment of development strategy and different evaluation of national economic situation, industrial development trend and enterprise development trend, it is almost impossible for different Banks to have completely consistent subjective evaluation of the same credit asset contract. Because of the difference of subjective evaluation, there must be "consumer surplus". As long as the cost of the transaction is lower than this "consumer surplus", we can be sure that as a profit-maximising bank, the transaction of this type of credit contract will be done. The strong evidence is that, with the development of information technology, the transaction cost has been greatly reduced, and the trading of financial derivatives has been increasing at an unusually high speed.

From the above theoretical analysis, we can find that in a perfect financial market, the fundamental purpose of Banks' participation in the transaction of credit contracts is to obtain the "consumer surplus" generated by different Banks' subjective evaluation of the same credit contracts, which is a clear profit-seeking behavior. But if we look closely at interbank lending in China, we see a very different picture.

In the second half of 2002, the central bank of China began to approve inter-bank credit asset transfer business. In fact, in the first half of 2002, some Banks were already secretly carrying out such business. However, as far as the current situation is concerned, the credit asset transfer business of some commercial Banks in China presents the following three main features. Second, the transfer of credit assets are short term; Third, the credit asset transfer agreement is often reached in the days before or even the day before commercial Banks report non-on-site regulatory information. In fact, it is these three characteristics that determine that China's commercial bank credit asset transfer has a completely different meaning from the general sense of credit asset transfer. If extreme, it can even be considered that the credit asset transfer business of some commercial Banks in China is not a normal profit-seeking behavior, but a tool to evade regulation.

If the Banks based on the above off-site regulatory data, to the relevant bank regulatory conclusion, the development of regulatory strategy, that may lead to serious problems. Fortunately, the current regulatory authorities have a variety of information collection channels, as well as a strong field supervision method, and initially established a mechanism and structure of continuous supervision. To some extent, the above information can be identified. However, because the remediation cost is relatively high and the regulatory authority is restricted by the regulatory resources and the regulatory cost, it can not be completely cleaned up. Therefore, to some extent, commercial Banks can cover up their business information and evade regulation through this legal method. Therefore, in a certain sense, China's credit asset transfer business does not have the positive function of credit asset transfer in developed financial markets, but on the contrary, it is alienated as a legitimate tool to evade regulation.

At present, China is facing the urgent process of increasing financial opening to the outside world. At the same time, the situation requires the regulatory authorities to encourage China's banking industry to strengthen innovation and improve its competitiveness. So, in the face of this alienation, we cannot stop with a one-size-fits-all approach. But this cannot be ignored. An in-depth analysis of the financial environment and the right "prescription" are the best choices. Through analysis, we can find a very important conclusion: under the current financial system environment and market environment in China, there is not enough "consumer surplus" for commercial Banks to obtain in the credit asset transfer business, and the evasion of regulation has become the fundamental driving force of credit asset transfer.

From the perspective of financial basic system environment, the incentive and restraint mechanism of commercial Banks has obvious short-term nature. For both state-owned Banks and joint-stock commercial Banks, on the one hand, bank operators are under pressure to seek short-term benefits from their owners, such as the pressure of increasing state revenue and the pressure of Stockholders' annual dividends. On the other hand, the government and enterprises are not completely separated in a fundamental sense. Although the phenomenon of government intervention in finance has improved significantly in recent years, it still exists to some extent. In some cases, bank operators should consider some special requirements of the government in the current period. However, these requirements of the government are not necessarily completely consistent with the long-term operation strategy of the bank in the time track, and sometimes even obviously reversed. Moreover, up to now, there is no banker market in the standard sense in China. The operators of Banks are not subject to market constraints, and their access and price are not determined by the market. Especially in the process of economic market transition, financial regulations and regulatory framework are under constant drastic changes. It is difficult for bank operators to form long-term expectations, so it is difficult for their behaviors to be long-term. In the basic background of short-duration behavior, the behavior of bank operators will undergo obvious changes, which is reflected in the fact that they do not care about the long-term development of the bank, but pay special attention to the position of the bank in the industry and the judgment of regulators, as well as the annual profit of the bank. We can predict that Banks will take full advantage of policies that improve these indicators; On the contrary, Banks will try to avoid policies that worsen these indicators. From the perspective of the financial market environment, there is not much difference in the subjective evaluation of the same credit asset or a group of credit assets among different commercial Banks in China at present. Naturally, the possibility of obtaining the credit contract "consumer surplus" through the transfer of credit asset is not great.

First, there is no marketization of interest rate in China, and the fluctuation range of interest rate is not much different. This limits the ability of each bank to make full use of their comparative advantages of managing different assets and making profits. Therefore, different commercial Banks in China have little difference in the pricing of the same or a group of credit assets. Price controls have led to the dissipation of consumer surplus "rents", which may be illustrated in another way.

Second, risk assessment is extensive with little difference. Banks lack the capacity to make profits from specialized management of a certain type of assets. Due to various reasons, China's banking industry is still in the stage of "horse racing and enclosure", and Banks are still operating with expanding market share as the core. The deep improvement of credit asset management ability and the intensification and refinement of bank operation have not been raised to the due agenda. For risk management, the core is only to cope with the supervision of the regulatory authorities, and to eliminate the external constraints imposed by the regulatory authorities on the development of the bank caused by excessive risks. The intrinsic motivation to strengthen risk management is obviously insufficient for the long-term healthy development of the bank. In this way, the Banks are more extensive about risk management. Outstanding performance is that the loan risk classification is relatively loose and there is no special independent risk management committee. Some risk management departments are more focused on the liquidation of non-performing loans rather than the comprehensive risk management of all credit assets. Due to the extensive risk management, Banks do not have too many fundamental differences in the risk evaluation of the same credit asset or a type of credit asset. Naturally, they do not have too many differences in the evaluation of this asset. Of course, there is no room for risk pricing in which they would benefit from taking on the transaction costs of these asset transfers. From this point on, it can be seen that if the fundamental situation of China's banking industry operation does not change, even if the interest rate liberalization becomes a reality, we cannot expect the transfer of credit assets in the standard sense to occur smoothly.

Third, China's economic development stage and economic pattern have contributed to the homogeneity of bank operation strategy and hindered the efforts of Banks to implement differentiated management of credit assets. The diversification and differentiation of Chinese Banks can be said to be the dream of regulators. To this end, the regulatory authorities have also paid great efforts. But the reality is not ideal. A typical example is that local joint-stock commercial Banks are struggling to break through regional restrictions and become national commercial Banks. City commercial bank is going all out to become a joint-stock commercial bank; The city credit union is seeking to become an urban commercial bank. Financial differentiation has not become the pursuit of commercial Banks. Instead, it is becoming a fashion and goal for commercial Banks to expand their sphere of influence and acquire all possible customer resources. As a result, every bank in our country is trying to do all the banking business, while all the Banks are in the same business field in a brutal "fight." As a result, the personalized services between Banks, differentiated services have become the service of the "fight to kill" tool. Of course, this is not irrational. Because, China's per capita GDP is still around $1,000, and in the context of the widening income gap, the potential customers who can provide profit space for financial services are relatively concentrated. At present, the enterprise credit investigation system is not complete, and the personal credit investigation system is relatively missing, which further increases the risk and cost of financial services. So Banks are trying to compete with each other for the same high-end customers, and business is converging. Unfortunately, this behavior in line with individual rationality reduces the comprehensive competitiveness of China's banking industry on the one hand, and on the other hand weakens the efforts of Banks to truly carry out differentiated services. The logical conclusion here, of course, is that a bank will not voluntarily sell a class of good credit assets or accept a class of risky bad credit assets without additional compensation.

In a word, Chinese Banks use asset transfer business to modify off-site indicators and legally evade supervision, which is the core meaning of bank credit asset transfer business. When the regulator approved the operation, it was expected that Banks would optimize their portfolio of assets, improve their liquidity and improve their professional operation and management.

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